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Abstract—Provisioning is the starting point of the
whole life-cycle of IoT devices. The traditional provi-
sioning methods of IoT devices are facing several issues,
either about user experience or privacy harvesting.
Moreover, IoT devices are vulnerable to different levels
of attacks due to limited resources and long online
duration.
In this paper, we proposed U2Fi, a novel provisioning
scheme for IoT devices. We provide a solution to make
the U2F device that has been trusted by the cloud in
the distribution process, via WiFi or its side channel,
to provision the new IoT device. Further, subsequent
device settings modification, setting update, and owner
transfer can also be performed by using a U2F device
that has been trusted to improve security and provide a
better user experience. This could provide helpful user
friendliness to some valuable new application scenarios
in IoT, such as smart hotel. Users could migrate the
whole authentication of smart devices into a new site
by simply inserting the universal cryptographic token
into the secure gateway and authorizing by pressing the
user-presence button on the token. Besides, the rele-
vant unbinding process could also be done with a single
cryptographic operation signed by the cryptographic
token.
Index Terms—IoT; Universal Cryptographic Token;
Provisoning
I. Introduction
New IoT application scenarios including smart hotels, smart
home, intelligent manufacturing, brilliant factory, etc., are
being developed in the commercial market with the help of
mass sales of smart speakers, smart bulbs, smart routers,
and smart sensors. However, IoT devices are vulnerable
to different levels of attacks due to limited resources and
long online duration. Moreover, the existing authentication
technology is relatively difficult to transplant to the home
and office LAN environment with a certain scale of IoT
equipment due to its relatively complicated design.
Provisioning is the first procedure in the whole life-cycle
and trust chain of IoT device, involving the exchange of
sensitive credential and plain-text passphrase of smart
home infrastructure. It builds up the cornerstone of trust
in identity authentication and secure transmission in the
entire life cycle of IoT.
The traditional provisioning methods of IoT device are
usually based on temporary WiFi hotspot or WiFi side
channels. Specifically, the IoT device establishes a tempo-
rary WiFi hotspot before the smartphone connects into
this temporary network, performing related configuration.
The disadvantage is that the operation is complicated and
not user-friendly. Another commonly utilized technology
that provides a better user experience is often referred to as
SmartCfg. Basically, the underlying principle of SmartCfg
is “packet length modulation”. The IoT device can listen
to the packet length of the encrypted WiFi packet, obtain
the initial password information, and complete the access
networking. Besides, mac addresses of WiFi broadcasting
packets are being utilized as a side channel as well.
Unfortunately, the credentials of this kind of provisioning
technology can be harvested by adversaries, since the
sensitive information is being transmitted over the air
without any cryptographic protection [1]. Other methods of
provisioning utilizing visual light communication between
the screen and photodiode in IoT devices are in use as well,
however, this could potentially increase the manufacturing
cost.
Fortunately, there are some efforts from the market which
could take away the barrier between the cryptographic
level of trust and consumer application, such as Universal
2nd Factor token. Two-factor Authentication (2FA) is
publicly adopted as the most effective way to reduce
the incidence of online identity theft and other online
fraud. FIDO Universal 2nd Factor (U2F) [2] [3] is an open
standard that strengthens and simplifies 2FA, with native
support in platforms and browsers and has been used by
Facebook [4], Google [5], Github [6], Dropbox [7], etc. A
secure element which performs cryptographic functions
and stores key pairs are embedded in each FIDO U2F
key, establishing the root of trust cryptographically. It has
several advantages over traditional password model, by
introducing challenge-response approaches to complete the
verification. Furthermore, it is USB driver-free as well as
supported by multi most commonly used browsers such as
Chrome, Firefox.
In this paper, we proposed U2Fi, a novel provisioning
scheme for IoT devices. We provide a solution to make
the U2F device that has been trusted by the cloud in
the distribution process, via WiFi (with IP connection)
or WiFi side channel (no IP connection). , to provision
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2the new IoT device. Further, subsequent device settings
modification, setting update, and owner change can also
be performed by using a U2F device that has been
trusted to improve security and provide a better user
experience. This could provide helpful user friendliness
to some valuable application scenarios in IoT, such as the
smart hotel. Users could migrate the whole authentication
of smart devices into a new site by simply inserting the
universal cryptographic token into the secure gateway and
authorizing by pressing the user-presence button on the
token. Besides, the relevant unbinding process could also
be done with a single cryptographic operation signed by
the cryptographic token.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
related background technologies are introduced, limitations
of which are discussed as well. In Section III, we introduce
the design goal as well as the architecture of U2Fi. Evalu-
ations of a scenario in the world of IoT are provided and
discussed in Section IV.
II. Backgrounds
In this section, we will discuss several provisioning schemes
that are commonly used in the IoT world, advantages and
disadvantages of which will also be discussed. Next, we will
introduce the principle and advantages of the universal
cryptographic token, and some security events will be
briefly introduced.
A. Provisioning Methods of IoT Devices
Provisioning is the starting point of the whole life-cycle of
IoT Devices. It involves the exchange of sensitive credential
and plain-text passphrase of smart home infrastructure and
builds up the cornerstone of trust in identity authentication
and secure transmission in the entire life cycle of IoT.
1) Temporary WiFi Hot Spot: Most IoT devices, limited
by cost and computing power, are usually designed to
be headless and lack user interaction. One of the most
common methods of provisioning is to press and hold the
configuration button on the IoT device to bring it into
configuration mode. Subsequently, the IoT device itself
became a temporary WiFi hotspot. Users use their own
smartphones to access this temporary hotspot and perform
related configuration operations. This approach does not
require additional hardware and development work for IoT
devices, as most IoT devices have built-in WiFi support.
For example, Google Home, Google Chromecast, Amazon
Echo, etc. all use this provisioning scheme.
However, this program has significant deficiencies. First,
setting up a temporary hotspot and switching the phone
to that hotspot configuration, and then switching back to
the wireless network infrastructure used daily, takes a long
time and often leads to failure. Second, this solution is even
more powerless for the initial access scenario of large-scale
IoT devices, because its trouble is further increased.
2) WiFi Side Channel: SmartCfg: Another way to pro-
vide a slightly better user experience is called SmartCfg.
SmartCfg is a provisioning scheme proposed by Texas
Instrument [8]. Its basic principle is to use some side
channel features of WiFi, such as the broadcast packet
length, or the MAC address of the broadcast packet, as
the distribution method of provisioning credentials. The
advantage of this solution is that the user only needs to
press the configuration button on the IoT device to put it
into configuration mode. The mobile phone no longer needs
to wait for the IoT device to establish a temporary WiFi
hotspot and then connect. However, the user must enter
the name and password of the accessed WiFi infrastructure
on the smartphone, which will then be transmitted on the
WiFi side channel in plain text or with limited encryption
strength. In recent years, some researchers have given the
possibility that SmartCfg is heavily collected in clear text
transmitted during the provisioning process [1].
In addition, there are some restrictions in this way. For
example, the IoT device must have its WiFi network card
enter a special promiscuous mode to monitor the WiFi
packets in the air. This can lead to some compatibility
issues.
3) Visible Light Communication: There are other pro-
visioning methods that simply introduce an additional
photodiode on the IoT device to sense the flashing intensity
of the flash on the smartphone screen, which modulates
the plaintext password required to access the WiFi. The
shortcomings of this scheme are also obvious. Due to the
instability of this communication method, the configura-
tion fails every now and then. Furthermore, additional
photodiodes also require the introduction of new materials
and manufacturing costs, which is vital in the production
process of a very large number of IoT equipment.
B. Universal Cryptographic Tokens
1) FIDO Universal 2nd Factor: FIDO is short for Fast
IDentity Online, which is an industry consortium launched
in February 2013. U2F is short for Universal 2nd Factor,
which is an open authentication standard that strengthens
and simplifies two-factor authentication using a specialized
USB or NFC device. It is initially developed by Google
and Yubico.
It’s now supported by Google, Facebook, Github, Dropbox,
Gitlab, Wordpress, Fastmail, Salesforce, Micro Focus,
Bitbucket, dashlane, Centrify, Duo, digidentity, RSA,
PushCoin, IBM, Keeper, RCDevs, shibboleth, Sentry,
privacyIDEA, StrongAuth, Compose, AuthStack, WSO2,
gandi.net, SAASPASS and so on.
Native browser supported of Chrome was introduced in
2014 by Google. Support for Firefox Quantum was added
in November 2017. As for Safari, there are some 3rd-party
plugins.
32) Benefits of Utilizing U2F: There several advantages of
utilizing U2F technology, such as:
• Driverless: With USB-HID utilized, there’s no need for
an extra driver in the operating system. It works out
of the box in most commonly used operating systems
such as Windows, macOS, Linux, and ChromeOS.
• Plugin-less: There’s no extra plugin to be installed
in web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox Quantum,
Opera(based on Chromium). They are now providing
native U2F support. Other browsers on the way.
• Expandable: The underlying raw message layer can
be run over Bluetooth Low Energy and NFC.
• Privacy: It will not leak the user’s identification since
no biometric information or phone number is needed.
3) Test of User Presence: The Test of User Presence (TUP)
is an optional function in FIDO U2F standard to prevent
inadvertent authentication when a USB U2F device is still
plugged in. Basically, it’s a boolean parameter, which is
signed as well as other response data by the private key
inside the USB device.
4) Secure Element: Typically, a well-designed U2F device
should be built with a cryptographic chip which is called
‘Secure Element’. A Secure Element generally has one or
more of the following abilities: a) On-chip public and private
key pair generation, and the corresponding public key can
be exported later. b) The public and private key pair are
generated outside the SE, and then the private key can
be imported to the secure element. c) Non-cryptographic
storage: write-only data (One Time Programming Zone)
d) Monotonic counters. If the secure element is used as a
scenario a), the whole process can be considered as ‘secure-
element-level’ safe. On the other hand, if scenario b) is
used, during the manufacturing process the private key
could possibly be recorded.
5) Key Wrapping Mechanism: According to the FIDO U2F
standard document [9], key-wrapping mechanism makes it
possible to authenticate with unlimited numbers of devices,
allowing for inexpensive U2F devices. The Key Handle
issued by the U2F device does not have to be an index
to the private key stored on board the U2F device secure
element chip. Instead, the Key Handle can ‘store’ (i.e.,
contain) the private key for the origin and the hash of the
origin encrypted with a ‘wrapping’ key known only to the
U2F device secure element.
6) Security Evalutations on U2F: Security evaluations on
U2F key-wrapping [10] indicate that it could introduce
a supply-chain risk if the anti-clone counter is not well
implemented and checked. A security bulletin has been
published by FIDO alliance, and related vendors have been
informed.
Another group of researchers demonstrated how to circum-
vent the FIDO U2F origin check using WebUSB [11]. This
kind of attack bypassed the origin check of the web browser
by setting up a phishing website utilizing W3C WebUSB
[12] to intercept U2F raw messages. It has been fixed by
the web browser vendor by blacklisting access types of
WebUSB feature.
Those attacks, as far as we know, are not related to U2F
authenticators. Thus, we should still be able to utilize the
well-designed universal authenticators as the cryptographic
signature generator in IoT scenarios.
III. Proposed Design
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Figure 1. The system architecture of proposed U2Fi provisioning
scheme for IoT devices.
A. Design Goals
Our design goal is to apply a two-factor authentication
technique based on cryptographic public key systems in
a resource-constrained IoT environment. Based on the
challenge-response authentication method, the technology
provides an easy-to-develop, use, and maintain identity
authentication technology. It has the advantages of USB
driver-free support and native browser native support,
which can dynamically generate a large number of tem-
porary keys simultaneously and meet the multi-semantic
authentication requirements.
In order to achieve this design goal, we use WiFi-based
packet length modulation technology in the U2F token
access process. At present, U2F technology only supports
BTLE/NFC/USB (HID) in the physical layer, and WiFi
is not supported in the standard. The WiFi-based packet
length modulation technology enables the IoT device to
obtain the initial password information and complete the
access networking by monitoring the packet length of the
encrypted WiFi packet without completing the WiFi access.
Our design is based on U2F’s IoT key nodes and authen-
tication protocols. IoT nodes increase the risk of being
compromised and controlled by features such as wide
distribution, difficulty in operation, numerous permissions,
and long-term online. Therefore, it is necessary to further
introduce enhanced security mechanisms to improve its se-
curity protection level. Design techniques for critical nodes
and authentication protocols rely on what users know about
secrets to ensure security, and on the other hand, use user-
owned (what you have) secrets to further enhance security.
In the IoT access networking and management, this key
technology can provide an authentication mechanism that
4enhances security. However, the details of its certification
agreement still need to be designed, and its security model
needs to be strictly demonstrated.
B. Architecture
Figure 2. Interaction diagram of the proposed architecture.
Typically, there are different 7 roles in our model. The
IoT device, which is a blank device without any user
information. A COTS U2F key, in possession of the user,
is offline in most of the time. A mobile phone, which is
also in possession of the user, however, is online most of
the time. In our system, we will avoid any possible use of
the online mobile phone as the attestation provider. As for
the cloud side, a new authentication server providing U2F
validation functionality is introduced alongside the regular
IoT service providing server.
As for the U2F key enrolling phrase, the user will initiate a
normal U2F binding process within the U2F portal website
provided by the IoT service provider. After necessary
security information such as account name, passphrase,
IP address, or even biometric characteristics are validated,
the public key and key handle of the U2F token is bound
to the user’s account.
As for the provisioning phrase for new registered IoT device,
the user should initiate a user identity binding request
with the help of a secure gateway. Regularly, the design
could use the help of existing user interaction method in
a COTS wireless router, such as multiplexing the WPS
button. After this phrase is initiated, the IoT cloud will
contact with U2F server to generate a U2F challenge and
pass it on to the secure gateway. Then, the secure gateway
will give a visual cue to the user indicating that the U2F
token should be connected within a reasonable duration of
time span. After the user has approved this provisioning
action by pressing the user-presence button on the token,
a cryptographic signature compatible with U2F response is
generated and forwarded to the relying party, i.e. IoT cloud.
Finally, the IoT cloud will generate an access token for
the IoT device after validating the U2F response against
U2F server. The entire provisioning phrase now has been
successfully proceeded.
IV. Evaluations
In this section, we will evaluate the design of our proposed
system by implementing a new IoT scenario. We will show
the necessary implementation details. After that, some
discussion of this implementation and achievement will
also be provided.
A. Scenario Description
This new scenario focuses on solving the problem of
users in a new environment who needs to commence the
provisioning process of a bunch of temporary IoT devices,
such as smart TV, smart speaker, smart bulb, smart
power outlet, etc., and performing some high-privilege and
sensitive behaviors, such as payment. Smart routers can
be implemented as a secure gateway with reasonable small
online upgrading. After connecting these smart devices
to the infrastructure, users also need to complete the
association of these devices with their own user identity.
A typical example of this scenario would be a tenant in
the smart hotel. In particular, the cryptographic token will
be taken away when the user leaves the hotel. The secure
gateway can be configured to cancel the temporary identity
binding for all smart devices once the outgoing behavior is
detected.
Smart Router
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Smart TV Smart Speaker Smart Light
Session Refresh Token
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Cloud
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Figure 3. Scenario Description
B. Implementation of Secure Gateway
The security gateway integrates the U2Fhost forwarding
module based on the basic functions of the network
connection for each IoT device, adds U2F authentication,
improves security, and implements management of multiple
IoT devices with high management efficiency.
In this part, we use the Raspberry Pi as a security gateway.
The reasons for selection are as follows: First, the Raspberry
Pi supports USB access and can carry U2F tokens; second,
the Raspberry Pi comes with a WiFi module to support
various IoT devices; third, its Linux environment can The
5code of the U2F-host module is integrated, and various
network protocols such as TCP/IP are supported, and the
communication between the U2F token and the U2F Server
and between the IoT device and the IoT Server can be well
realized.
The U2F-host library is installed in the security gateway to
exchange information such as challenge and response with
the U2F token during the registration and authentication
process. In addition, the paho-mqtt library is installed to
communicate with the cloud service platform. By writing
python code, you can exchange information between U2F
tokens, security gateways, and U2F servers.
We provide a callback function based on paho-mqtt,
invoking the U2F-host library. When the IoT Cloud needs
to perform registration or authentication operations, it
sends a message to the security gateway with the subject
u2f_host, content ‘register’ or ‘authenticate’, and the se-
curity gateway discriminates the message content and calls
the corresponding function. The function of the function
is to simulate the user’s registration or authentication
operation.
C. Integration with Cloud Platform
The cloud service platform consists of two parts: U2F
Server and IoT Cloud. It can be implemented on a PC
by writing the corresponding python code. The U2F
Server is a server that implements U2F registration and
authentication. Support U2F registration/authentication
operations. When a U2F Zero token is registered, the U2F
Server will save the public key. When authentication is
required, the U2F Server uses the public key to decrypt
the encrypted data sent by the U2F host to complete the
authentication. After registration/authentication, the U2F
Server sends a message to the IoT Cloud indicating whether
the registration/authentication was successful. After IoT
Cloud receives this message, it can proceed. We provide
a callback library for the U2F Server to serve those two
functions.
The IoT Cloud is responsible for recording the registration
information of the IoT device and allowing the user to
remotely monitor the running status of the IoT device.
User operations on the IoT Cloud can be divided into
three categories: U2F registration operations, important
operations (requires U2F authentication), and non-critical
operations (no U2F authentication required).
• When the user initiates a U2F registration operation,
the IoT Cloud will send an instruction to the security
gateway to instruct it to start registration, and when
the authentication is completed, ask the user which
operations are set as important operations.
• When the user initiates an important operation, the
IoT Cloud first sends an instruction to enable the
U2F authentication to the security gateway. After the
authentication is completed, the IoT Cloud sends the
operation command to the IoT device.
• When the user initiates a non-critical operation, the
IoT Cloud sends the operation command directly to
the IoT device.
In the demonstration system, IoT Cloud can control the
IoT device and realize the function of turning on the
camera, which requires U2F authentication. The camera is
initialized after register and open instruction input by
the user.
D. Emulation of IoT Devices
In the demo system, the IoT device, emulated by a Rasp-
berry Pi, will open the camera after receiving the command.
The picamera library is utilized to control the onboard
camera, and the paho-mqtt library is used to communicate
with the IoT cloud. The core code is a callback function
based on paho-mqtt, as shown in the following pseudo-
code. When the message U2F_AUTHENTICATED sent by the
IoT cloud is received, the camera is turned on and the
preview mode is entered.
E. Discussion
Figure 4. Demo system
Figure 5. Validation of U2F user presence. | IoT Camera registered
accordingly.
6It can be seen from the above evaluations that the system
can successfully add U2F authentication to the communi-
cation between the IoT device and the cloud server, and
realize the verification of the physical authorization of the
U2F token to the user entity.
In the existing IoT system, the IoT Cloud does not need to
be authenticated for the IoT device. If the attacker steals
the user’s ID and password, the IoT Cloud can be logged
in to and send malicious instructions to the IoT device.
In this system, before the cloud service sends important
instructions to the device, it needs to wait for the user to
perform U2F authentication operation (ie, press the button
of the U2F token inserted on the security gateway). After
the U2F authentication succeeds, the relevant commands
can pass the security. The gateway sends the IoT device
to ensure the security of communication between the IoT
device and the cloud server.
Besides, we provide an improved SmartCfg distribution
method. In the traditional distribution network solution
and the mainstream SmartCfg distribution solution, the
mobile device App and the IoT device need to be connected
to each other, and then the SSID and password of the router
are transmitted through the WiFi packet length modula-
tion. In this work, the IoT device’s network connection
and U2F authentication are combined, and the U2F token
on the security gateway can be operated securely, which
greatly simplifies the distribution process.
At the same time, the combination of U2F standard and IoT
security certification. U2F, as an emerging network security
authentication method, has been widely used in many large-
scale services, but basically, it is aimed at network security.
Combined with the current hot concept of IoT security
authentication, we have successfully combined the two
to achieve two-factor security authentication on the IoT
platform, thereby using the security gateway (key node)
to authenticate multiple IoT devices mounted. It achieves
the purpose of secure communication and enhances the
user’s operating experience, which has great application
prospects.
This could provide helpful user friendliness to some valuable
new application scenarios in IoT, such as the smart
hotel. Users could migrate the whole authentication of
smart devices into a new site by simply inserting the
universal cryptographic token into the secure gateway and
authorizing by pressing the user-presence button on the
token. Besides, the relevant unbinding process could also
be done with a single cryptographic operation signed by
the cryptographic token.
V. Conclusion
Our proposed solution includes a new SmartCfg encoding
method to combine U2F with IoT security certification.
Further, a feasible solution is proposed in the field of IoT
security certification and a demonstration system is given.
Considering smart hotel, smart home and smart office
scenarios, we can apply this solution to IoT devices and
implemented the security management of batch devices,
and improve the user’s operating experience while ensuring
security. The solution requires multi-party support for IoT
terminals, security gateways (routers), U2F physical tokens,
and commercial cloud services, which has great application
prospects and a broad market.
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